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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
vs. 
WAYNE T. BLOMQUIST, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 10106 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Action by Industrial Loan Corporation on note. De-
fense of usury because of provision for attorney fees in 
note. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Court ruled note was not usurious and granted judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in his favor as a matter of law, or failing that, a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, a Utah Industrial Loan Corporation, brought 
this action to collect the unpaid balance of a loan plus 
interest, costs and attorney fees. The parties stipulated 
that the sole issues raised by the pleadings which are 
material herein is whether or not an industrial loan com-
pany may contract for and recover reasonable attorneys 
fees in the event of default in payment by borrower, 
(R. 13-14) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PROVISION FOR ATTORNEY FEES IN INDUS-
TRIAL LOAN RENDERS TRANSACTION USURIOUS. 
The loan in issue in this matter was made by Plaintiff, 
a Utah Industrial Loan Corporation which is licensed 
under the provisions of Title 7, Chapter 8, UCA, 1953. 
The loan provides for payment by defendant of a reason-
able attorneys fees in the event of default. (R. 3). The 
parties have stipulated that the sole issue before the 
Court is "whether an industrial loan corporation may 
contract for and recover reasonable attorneys fees in the 
event of default upon a note and chattel mortgage by 
borrower". ( R. 13, Par 1 (a). 
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The Industrial Loan Law of the State of Utah is, in 
effect, a Usury law designed and enacted to protect those 
whom necessity compels to borrow from outrageous de-
mands oftentimes made and required by those who have 
money to loan. That Industrial Loan Law is an exception 
to regular interest rates and that law permits plaintiff to 
charge interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month on the 
original balance of the loan, to add the interest to the loan 
and to require repayment of the loan in installments, 
Seaboard Finance Co., v. Wahlen, 123 U. 529, 260 P. 2d 
~53. 557. thus yielding an effective rate of interest to 
plaintiff of in excess of 30 per cent per annum. See 
Greene, ''Unlicensed and Licensed Usury in Utah, 4 Utah 
Law Re\·iew 79; 55 Am Jur Usury, 6. Since this type of 
legislation was designed as a shield to the borrower the 
Court should not permit the usury statutes to be so con-
~'trued as to permit the lender to use the statute as a 
s\\·ord. Rosp:gliosi v. Glenallen Min. Co., 69 U. 41, 47, 252 
P. 276; Seebold V. Eustermann, 13 NW (2d) 739, 152 ALR 
585; 40 Am Jur Pawnbrokers, etc. 8. 
The question of whether the addition of attorney fees 
to a loan renders the loan usurious has been litigated 
throughout the United States, however the Utah Legisla-
ture has seen fit to expressly provide that in certain in-
stances a provision for reasonable attorney fees may be 
included in the contract. 15-1-2 (b), UCA, 1953. That 
~tatute reads in part as follows: 
''15-1-2. MAXIMUM RATES.-The parties to any 
contract may agree in writing for the payment of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, 
goods or things in action, not to exceed ten per cent 
per annum; proYided: 
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(a) ... 
(b) That a loan may provide for reasonable collec-
tion costs and for a reasonable attorney's fee in the 
event of default or delinquency." 
Sub-paragraph (d) pertaining to small loan companies, 
(e) pertaining to credit unions and (f) pertaining to in-
dustrial loan companies all provide that those organiza-
tions may contract for and receive interest and charge at 
the rates specified in and subject to the limitations con-
tained in the statutes regulating each type of organiza-
tion. The wording used in sub-paragraphs (d), (e), and 
(f) clearly indicates that reference in that statute to loans 
made by such organizations were included in that statute 
as exceptions to the rules pertaining to other loans, par-
ticularly with respect to rates of interest to be charged 
and the addition of attorney fees, collection costs or other 
charges. 
Sub-paragraph (d) of 15-1-2, UCA, 1953, pertaining to 
small loan companies refers to the small loan act Title 78, 
Chapter 10, UCA, 1953 which provides in part in 78-10-13 
(c), UCA, 1953, that: 
" (c) In addition to the charges herein provided for, 
no further or other a·mount whatsoever shall be di-
rectly or indirectly charged, contracted for, or re-
ceived except as provided hereinafter ... " (Em-
phasis added) 
If sub-paragraph (b) pertaining to attorneys fees 
were construed to permit a charge for attorney fees by 
the organizations mentioned in sub-paragraphs (d), (e) 
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and (f) it would be in direct conflict with the above 
quoted section. The conclusion is inescapeable that sub-
section (b) of 15-1-2, UCA, 1953, does not confer the 
power to charge attorneys fees upon the organizations de-
scribed in sub-paragraph (d), (e) or (f) thereof. 
Sub-paragraph (f) of 15-1-2, UCA, 1953, pertaining to 
industrial loan corporations reads as follows: 
"(f) That industrial loan corporations may contract 
for and receive interest and charges at the rates and 
subject to the limitations contained in chapter 8, Title 
7, Utah Code Annotated 1953; ... " (Emphasis added) 
The express wording of said sub-paragraph (f) is that the 
··charges·· which "industrial loan corporations may con-
tract for and receive" is limited to those specified in the 
industrial loan law, Title 7, Chapter 8, UCA, 1953. This 
wording expressly excludes the power of an industrial 
loan corporation to contract to "charge" attorney fees 
under the provisions of 15-1-2, UCA, 1953. 
The powers of an industrial loan corporation to con-
tract for and receive the "interest" and "charges" referred 
to in 15-1-2 (f), UCA, 1953, are enumerated in 7-8-3 UCA 
' ' 1953, \\'hich provides in part as follows: 
7-8-3. GENERAL POWERS.-Every industrial loan 
corporation shall have power: 
( 1 ) ( a) To lend money and contract for and receive 
charges not exceeding the charges authorized 
by paragraphs b, c, and d of this subsection 
' subject to compliance with all applicable pro-
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VISions of this chapter. Every loan contract 
made under this section may provide for repay-
ment in a single payment or in installment pay-
ments. Charges may be added to the principal 
of the loan and included in the face of the loan 
contract. 
Sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) mentioned 
above provide in part as follows: 
(b) To charge interest ... at the rate of one per 
cent per month ... 
(c) To charge a fee of $2.00 ... or $20.00 I I • 
in examining and investigating the character 
and circumstances of the borrower. 
(d) To refund unearned interest or discount ... 
As indicated above, an industrial loan corporation can-
not "contract for" or receive charges" in excess of those 
authorized by sub-paragraphs (b) pertaining to the rate 
of interest to be charged, and (c) pertaining to an in-
vestigation fee which may be charged and are required 
in paragraph (d) to refund unearned interest in the event 
of pre-payment of the loan. Clearly the inclusion of a 
provision in the note for payment of attorney fees in the 
event of default is to "contract for'' "charges" which are 
not authorized by any of said sub-paragraphs of 7-8-3, 
UCA, 1953, and to permit the plaintiff to collect attorney 
fees is to permit it to "receive charges'' in excess of those 
authorized and which are not authorized by said sub-
paragraphs. If the legislature had intended to permit in-
dustrial loan corporations to collect attorney fees they 
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would have listed attorney fees with the other detailed 
and itemized charges which are permitted. 
In addition to the foregoing powers 7-8-4, UCA, 1953, 
l:onfers upon industrial loan corporations "the general 
powers conferred upon corporations by the Utah Business 
Corporation act, ... except as otherwise provided herein." 
The general powers of corporations conferred upon plain-
tiff by this section does not entitle plaintiff to collect at-
torney fees on its loans. To the contrary, that statute 
l"xpressly makes an exception and does not confer general 
corporation powers upon plaintiff which are in conflict 
with the provisions of the industrial loan act. The only 
"charges'' which can be contracted for or received by an 
industrial loan corporation are spelled out in 7-8-3, UCA, 
1953, and accordingly any general corporation power 
\\'hich might tend to confer upon plaintiff the right to 
collect attorney fees on its loans would be excluded by 
the exception contained in 7-8-4, UCA, 1953. 
It is a general principal of law concerning construction 
of statutes that where the statute mentions one or a series 
of things, that the menion of those specific items implies 
the exclusion of other things not mentioned. The Latin 
term ''Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" is applied 
to this general principal of law. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 U. 
198, 48 P. (2d) 513, 101 ALR 532; UniveTsity of Utah v. 
Richards, 20 U. 457, 59 P. 96, 77 Am St. Rep. 928; Nelden 
l'. Clark, 20 U. 382, 59 P. 524, 77 Am St. Rep 917, 50 Am 
Jur Statutes 238. This rule applies even though there are 
no negative words excluding the things not mentioned. 
In Re Peterson, 42 NW2d 59. 18 ALR 2d 910; 50 Am Jur 
StJtutes 238-239. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
The legislature has seen fit to permit plaintiff to charge 
a rate of interest vastly in excess of that which may be 
charged by others. To read into the statute a right to 
make charges for attorney fees when the legislature has 
maticulously defined what may be charged by plaintiff 
and has stated that no other charges can be contracted for 
or received would be to read into the statute something 
which is not there. The state owes a duty to protect the 
unfortunate victim of rapacity so far as it is practicable, 
just as clearly as it does to protect the ignorant and the 
unwary from the machinations of the confidence man or 
the extortion of the highwayman. See 69 ALR 585, s. 125 
ALR 743. 
After the answer and counterclaim (R. 7-9) had been 
filed the parties entered into a stipulation (R. 13-14) 
wherein they agreed the only issue before the court was 
the question of whether attorney fees could be charged by 
an industrial loan corporation, plaintiff filed a motion for 
summary judgment (R. 11-12) which came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, District Judge, 
who denied plaintiff's motion (R. 16) after hearing oral 
argument by the respective counsel and considering the 
written memorandum submitted by plaintiff in support 
thereof. This order (R. 16) was a holding by Judge 
Jeppson that plaintiff could not legally charge attorney 
fees on an industrial loan. Defendant then made a motion 
for summary judgment (R. 19-20) based upon that ruling, 
however Judge Jeppson declined to consider that motion 
(R. 27-30) because plaintiff had filed a notice of readiness 
for trial ( R. 36) before that motion was heard, and ac-
cordingly defendant's motion was referred to the pre-trial 
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judge, the Honorable A. H. Ellett, who in effect reversed 
the decision of the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson concern-
ing the right of the plaintiff to collect attorney fees and 
awarded judgment in favor of plaintiff. Since two judges 
of the same district have ruled exactly opposite on the 
sa1ne question it is obvious that some confusion exists as 
to the status of the law and that this question should be 
l'h1rified. We feel that Judge Jeppson ruled properly on 
this question and that the ruling of Judge Ellett should 
be reversed. Defendant has paid the loan in full including 
the interest claimed by plaintiff (R. 13-14) and should be 
entitled to recover back the excess interest paid plus 
triple damages and attorneys fees in accordance with the 
provisions of 15-1-7, UCA, 1953, in the event that the 
Court determines that the note is usurious, or in the al-
ternative, should be entitled to an order adjudging that 
defendant is not liable to plaintiff for attorney fees or 
costs by reason of his tender (R. 10) and payment (R. 13) 
a~ provided by Rule 68 (a) and related rules. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Jeppson properly rules that the plaintiff as 
an industrial loan corporation was not entitled to recover 
attorney fees since the statute enumerating the "charges" 
\vhich could be made by an industrial loan corporation 
excludes the right to make or receive any other additional 
charges and no provision is made therein for charging the 
defendant with attorney fees. Judge Ellett erred when 
he reYer~ed the decision of Judge Jeppson and held by 
granting judgment for plaintiff at the pre-trial that an 
industrial loan corporation can charge and collect attor-
ney fees. The wording of 7-8-3, UCA, 1953, which gives an 
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industrial loan corporation power: "To lend money and 
contract and receive charges not exceeding the charges 
authorized by paragraphs b, c, and of this subsection ... " 
is controlling as to the "charges" which may be "con-
tratced" for or "received" by the plaintiff. Since those 
sub-sections do not permit plaintiff to "charge" an attor-
ney fee it is clear that plaintiff has no power to either 
"contract" for or to "receive" an attorney fee from plain-
tiff, and the inclusion of an attorney fee provision in the 
note renders the note usurious. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant. 
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